Amending Corporate Charters and Bylaws by Choi, Albert H. & Min, Geeyoung
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
8-16-2017 
Amending Corporate Charters and Bylaws 
Albert H. Choi 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Geeyoung Min 
Columbia University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Business Organizations 
Law Commons, Commercial Law Commons, Contracts Commons, Corporate Finance Commons, Law and 
Economics Commons, and the Law and Society Commons 
Repository Citation 
Choi, Albert H. and Min, Geeyoung, "Amending Corporate Charters and Bylaws" (2017). Faculty 
Scholarship at Penn Law. 1898. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1898 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
Page 1 of 31 
Amending Corporate Charters and Bylaws 
Albert H. Choi and Geeyoung Min* 
August 16, 2017 
Abstract 
Recently, courts have embraced the contractarian theory that corporate charters and bylaws 
constitute a “contract” between the shareholders and the corporation and have been more 
willing to uphold bylaws unilaterally adopted by the directors.  This paper examines the 
contractarian theory by drawing a parallel between amending charters and bylaws, on the 
one hand, and amending contracts, on the other.  In particular, the paper compares the right 
to unilaterally amend corporate bylaws with the right to unilaterally modify contract terms, 
and highlights how contract law imposes various limitations on the modifying party’s 
discretion.  More generally, when the relationship of contracting parties is compared to that 
of shareholders and managers, the paper notes several important differences that could 
make shareholders (particularly, minority shareholders) more vulnerable to potential hold-
up and counter-party opportunism.  For example, unlike contracting parties who have the 
right to terminate the contractual relationship or opt out of undesirable modifications, 
shareholders lack the right of termination or opt-out.  As a possible solution, the paper 
considers various mechanisms, including optional redemption, more robust disclosure, 
shareholder voting, and active judicial oversight.  The paper suggests that active judicial 
oversight, through vigorous application of the “proper” and “equitable” purpose test or 
imposition of good faith and fair dealing obligations, would be better in retaining the 
desired flexibility and policing opportunism by both managers and controlling 
shareholders. 
* Professor and Albert C. BeVier Research Professor of Law, University of Virginia Law School, and Adjunct
Assistant Professor and Postdoctoral Fellow in Corporate Law and Governance, Columbia Law School,
respectively.  We would like to thank Rick Brooks, Larry Hamermesh, Joshua Mitts, Roberta Romano, Sarath
Sanga, Matt Shapiro, Emily Stolzenberg, George Triantis, and workshop participants at the University of
Virginia Law School for many helpful comments and suggestions.  We would also like to thank MacLane
Taggart for excellent research assistance.  Comments are welcome to albert.choi@virginia.edu and
geeyoung.min@gmail.com.
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Introduction 
 
Over the past decade or so, courts have been more willing to apply the 
“contractarian” theory to the organizational documents of corporations: charters 
(certificates or articles of incorporation) and bylaws.  The notion that the charters and 
bylaws can be thought of as “contracts”—between a corporation and its shareholders and 
among the shareholders—dates back to the seminal work by Jensen and Meckling and to 
the idea that the corporate organization can be viewed as a “nexus of contracts.”1  Based in 
part on this theory, numerous practitioners and corporate law scholars have argued that 
corporate law should take a more enabling approach by minimizing the number of 
mandatory provisions, by offering an optimal set of default (“off the rack”) terms, and by 
enforcing parties’ arrangements of their affairs (“private ordering”) in charters and 
bylaws.2  Perhaps due to the influence of the contractarian theory, corporate statutes—
                                                 
1 See Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305 at 310 – 311 (1976) (stating that “most 
organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among 
individuals…the private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for 
contracting relationships”) (emphasis original).  Jensen and Meckling make numerous inferences to Ronald 
Coase’s earlier work.  See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937).  Numerous 
scholars have analyzed the theory over the years.  See John Coffee, No Exit?: Opting Out, The Contractual 
Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 Brooklyn Law Review 919 (1988); John 
Coffee, The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law; An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 Columbia 
Law Review 1618 (1989); Lucian Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable 
Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 Harvard Law Review 1820 (1989); Marcel Kahan & Michael 
Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 
83 Virginia Law Review 713 (1997); Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 6 American Law and 
Economics Review 1 (2006); James Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering, 93 Washington 
University Law Review 257 (2015); Ann Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration 
Clauses in Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 Georgetown Law Review 583 (2016); Jonathan Rohr, 
Corporate Governance, Collective Action and Contractual Freedom: Justifying Delaware’s New 
Restrictions on Private Ordering, forthcoming in Delaware Journal of Corporate Law (2017).  The nexus of 
contract theory, while facially correct, is a bit misleading in the corporation and agency contexts.  When two 
parties, e.g., a prospective client and a lawyer, enter into an agency relationship using a contract, obviously, 
the vertical relationship is based on and is created through a contract, but most of the post-formation issues, 
that are not expressly (or impliedly) dealt with in the contract, including amending the initial contract, can 
be subject of the agency law, rather than contract law, triggering additional obligations, such as fiduciary 
duty.  One purpose of this paper is to deal with the issue of to what extent can an agent change the agency 
relationship when the right of modification is granted upon her in the initial agency contract.  See Deborah 
DeMott, Forum-Selection Bylaws Refracted through an Agency Lens, 57 Arizona Law Review 269 (2015) 
on the application of the agency law principles to unilaterally adopted forum-selection bylaws. 
2 See Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 Columbia Law Review 1416 (1989) 
(stating that the corporation is a complex set of explicit and implicit contracts, and corporate law enables the 
participants to select the optimal arrangement for the many different sets of risks and opportunities that are 
available in a large economy.  No one set of terms will be best for all; hence the ‘enabling’ structure of 
corporate law”) and Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory 
Corporate Laws, 89 Columbia Law Review 1599 (1989) (arguing that mandatory corporate law cannot be 
easily justified).  But see Jeffrey Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 Columbia Law 
Review 1549 (1989) (doubting that full contractual freedom in corporate law will lead to private wealth 
maximization and advocating for some mandatory rules).  See also Coffee (1989), supra note 1, at 1621 
(stating that the “stable mandatory core” of corporate law is the “institution of judicial oversight”). 
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Delaware statutes, in particular—require only a small number of provisions in the charter 
and leave almost complete discretion with respect to the contents of the bylaws.3 
 
What is new and controversial, however, is the fact that the courts have been willing 
to apply these ideas even to cases where the directors unilaterally have amended bylaws 
without shareholders’ express ex post approval.4  With respect to corporate charters, state 
statutes mandate a set of procedures that must be satisfied when a corporation wants to 
amend its charter.5  Under both the Model Business Corporation Act and Delaware General 
Corporation Law, for example, only the directors can make a proposal to amend the charter 
and, apart from a few exceptions,6 there must be express shareholder approval of the 
proposal for an amendment to be effective.7  More importantly, neither the directors nor 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Model Business Corporation Act §§2.02 and 2.06; and Delaware General Corporation Law 
§§102(a) and 109.  At various sections, Delaware statute, for instance, expressly incorporates the phrase, 
“unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation,” and allows the parties to opt out of the default 
terms.  Even the directors’ managerial rights provision is subject to restrictions in the charter.  Delaware 
General Corporation Law §141(a) states: “the business and affairs of every corporation organized under this 
chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise 
provided…in its certificate of incorporation.”  With respect to the charter, the most important mandatory 
provision is the one on capital structure.  Delaware law expressly allows certain optimal provisions in the 
charter and some of these are almost always included in the charters of publicly traded corporations.  They 
are: (1) liability limitation for the directors and officers under DGCL §102(b)(7); (2) granting the directors 
discretion to issue preferred stock (“blank check preferred provision”) under DGCL §102(a)(4); (3) right to 
amend bylaws under DGCL §109(a); and (4) the right to change the number of authorized shares without a 
class vote under DGCL §242(b)(2).  This is not to say that the Delaware statute has fully embraced the 
contractarian theory.  If we look outside the charter, there are various mandatory provisions, such as 
stockholders electing directors annually (§211(b)), stockholders have the right to vote by proxy (§212(b)), 
and not having more than three classes on the board (§141(d)).  See Gordon (1989).  With respect to the 
opting out hypothesis, Hansmann (2006) has argued that, due to various impediments, including draft 
(amending) costs and network externality, corporations are more likely to not opt out of default provisions 
and, instead, to “delegate” future amendments to state legislatures and courts.  See also Kahan and Klausner 
(1997) (examining the network externality effects of corporate charter provisions). 
4 Earlier scholarly debate over contractarian (nexus of contract) theory focused mostly on the issues of mid-
stream charter amendments, problems of collective action and shareholder apathy with respect to voting on 
charter amendment proposals, and whether there is room for mandatory corporate law.  See supra notes 1 
and 2.  This paper takes a step further by examining the validity of the contractarian theory as it is applied to 
the issues of delegation and unilateral amendment of bylaws. 
5 See, e.g., Model Business Corporation Act §10.03 and Delaware General Corporation Law §242.  For a 
more detailed analysis of charter amendments, including the requirements and procedures under the federal 
securities laws, see Geeyoung Min, Shareholder Activism and Charter Amendments, forthcoming in Journal 
of Corporate Law (2018). 
6 For Delaware corporations, unless expressly prohibited by the charter, the directors can unilaterally change 
the name of the corporation, delete the names of the incorporators, or delete the provisions that were 
necessary to effect stock exchange, reclassification, etc., when such changes have become effective.  See 
Delaware General Corporation Law §241(b)(1).  See also Model Business Corporation Act §10.05.  
Furthermore, the charter can grant the right to issue new classes of stock with desired preferences to the 
directors.  See Delaware General Corporation law §102(a)(4).  Such a provision is known as the “blank-
check preferred” provision. 
7 See Model Business Corporation Act §10.03 and Delaware General Corporation Law §242.  Charter 
amendment is considered to be a “fundamental” change to the corporation, thereby triggering shareholder 
approval requirement.  When a proposed charter amendment “adversely affects” a certain class of 
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the shareholders can unilaterally amend the charter.  Amending the bylaws, however, is a 
different matter.  While reserving the amendment authority (including the right of unilateral 
amendment) to the shareholders, corporate statutes allow directors to unilaterally amend 
the bylaws, either as a matter of default or when the shareholders grant such power through 
a provision in the charter.8  While the precise scope of this authority (e.g., whether they 
can amend shareholder-adopted bylaws) remains somewhat uncertain,9 recent cases have 
meaningfully expanded directors’ freedom. 
 
The recent focus on and controversy over unilaterally amended bylaws10 is not 
surprising in light of the rise of shareholder activism and concerns over deal-related 
shareholder litigation perceived as being “out of control.”11  For instance, if the directors 
want to counteract an activist hedge fund, doing so through charter amendment would be 
undesirable.  Because a charter amendment requires an express shareholder approval, not 
only will the amendment be time-consuming and costly, but the proposal may also fail to 
secure requisite shareholder approval.  Furthermore, influential proxy advisory firms, such 
as Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis, have the policy of giving negative 
recommendations at the next director election when a firm adopts a charter provision 
considered adverse to the interests of shareholders, such as staggering the board.12  Such 
factors render charter amendments an unattractive and ineffective strategy against 
shareholder activism.  The same rationale applies in the case of directors dealing with 
imminent shareholder litigation, for instance, when the corporation is about to execute a 
merger and the directors expect shareholder lawsuits to be filed once it is announced.13 
 
In contrast, unilaterally amending the bylaws can be done fast, at low cost, and with 
certainty.  Bylaws—which, in most cases, deal with more “procedural” than “substantive” 
issues—are considered less salient from the shareholders’ and the market’s perspective.  
For example, by requiring all shareholder lawsuits to be filed in Delaware, the directors 
can better “manage” out-of-control shareholder litigation.  Similarly, incumbent directors 
can better prepare for a potentially costly proxy fight by adopting a bylaw that requires any 
insurgent shareholder to provide detailed information about their director-nominees.  
Finally, because directors can dictate the contents of bylaws, even when they adopt a bylaw 
                                                 
shareholders, that class will get to vote on the proposal as a separate class.  See Delaware General Corporation 
Law §242(b)(2). 
8 See, e.g., Model Business Corporation Act §10.20 and Delaware General Corporation Law §109.  Almost 
all publicly traded corporations that are incorporated in Delaware have the express provision in their charters 
granting the right to amend bylaws to the directors.  See Min (2018). 
9 The ambiguity stems from the fact that the statute expressly reserves the right of the shareholders to amend 
bylaws without consent or approval by the directors.  See infra part I for more detailed discussion. 
10 See Lawrence Hamermesh, Director Nominations, 39 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 117 (2014) for 
examples of directors’ adopting advance notice bylaws in response to shareholder activism regarding director 
elections. 
11 See Albert Choi, Optimal Fee-Shifting Bylaws, forthcoming in Virginia Law Review (2018) for a brief 
overview about the concerns over deal-related shareholder litigation and how that led corporations to adopt 
fee-shifting and exclusive forum bylaws. 
12 See Min (2018) for a more detailed analysis. 
13 Since fee-shifting bylaws have been prohibited by Delaware statute, the most common response against 
merger-related litigation seems to be adopting an exclusive forum bylaw. 
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putatively in response to shareholders’ demands, they can devise a system that is 
potentially more favorable to them, while still showing “fidelity” to the wishes of the 
shareholders.14 
 
Recent examples of bylaws unilaterally amended by directors include those 
pertaining to: (1) advance notice; (2) exclusive forum; (3) special shareholder meeting, and 
(4) fee-shifting.15  An advance notice bylaw, for instance, requires insurgent shareholders 
to submit notice to directors of both their intention to wage a proxy fight and also 
information regarding their proposed slate of director-nominees within a stipulated window 
of time (say, between 90 and 120 days) before the shareholder meeting.16  An exclusive 
forum bylaw requires shareholders to file corporate lawsuits only in a certain forum, e.g., 
the forum of the state of incorporation.  The right to convene special shareholder meeting 
bylaw allows only those shareholders with requisite ownership (often 5% or more of the 
outstanding stock) to call a special shareholders’ meeting.  Finally, a fee-shifting bylaw 
allows the corporation to recover fees and expenses from the plaintiff-shareholders if the 
plaintiff-shareholders do not completely “prevail” in either direct or derivative litigation.17 
 
While most of these bylaw amendments seem to deal more with “procedural” 
issues, they can undoubtedly affect the substantive rights of shareholders.  When 
shareholders challenged bylaw amendments in court, the courts have upheld the 
amendments by applying the contractarian principle.  Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion 
in ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund18 is exemplary.  Upholding a fee-shifting 
bylaw unilaterally adopted by the directors of ATP Tour, Inc., the court stated that charters 
and bylaws constitute a “contract” between a corporation and its shareholders,19 and 
directors can amend the bylaws by adopting a fee-shifting provision because that right is 
granted to them in ATP’s charter.  The Delaware Chancery Court applied similar reasoning 
                                                 
14 This is the idea behind the “compromised implementation,” as noted in Min (2018), where the directors, 
putatively in response to shareholders’ (often repeated) requests to institute a certain corporate governance 
regime, would adopt a bylaw provision but with variation (or “compromise”).  By doing so, the directors can 
argue that they are being faithful to shareholders’ demands while (potentially) protecting their own interests.  
Whether such compromised implementation is, in fact, shareholder value-reducing is an empirical question 
which needs further examination. 
15 Other examples include: amending the size of the board (after stipulating in the charter that only the board 
can determine the size); adopting a majority voting standard for director elections; allowing insurgent 
shareholders access to the company’s proxy (usually combined with a strong advance notice requirement); 
and imposing procedural requirements for the stockholders to execute a written consent.  For an overview of 
recently contested bylaws, see Min (2018), Hamermesh (2014), Jill Fisch, The New Governance and the 
Challenge of Litigation Bylaws, 81 Brooklyn Law Review 1637 (2016), and Jill Fisch, Governance by 
Contract: The Implications for Corporate Bylaws, forthcoming in California Law Review (2018). 
16 See Hamermesh (2014) for a detailed analysis and examples of recently contested advanced notice bylaws. 
17 See Choi (2018) for a detailed analysis of fee-shifting bylaws.  Exclusive forum and fee-shifting bylaws, 
in particular, have been used more as a response to shareholder litigation (in particular, deal-related litigation) 
that has been perceived as out of control.  Id. 
18 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014). 
19 According to the Court, “corporate bylaws are ‘contracts among a corporation’s shareholders’…” Id. at 
558.  Due partly to concern over chilling, even legitimate shareholder lawsuits, the Delaware Legislature will 
later amend the corporate statute and prohibit fee-shifting provisions from being included either in the charter 
or the bylaws.  See DGCL §§109(b) and 115.  See generally Choi (2018). 
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when validating an exclusive forum bylaw in Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. 
Chevron Corp.20  The court stated that “the bylaws constitute a binding part of the contract 
between a Delaware corporation and its stockholders,”21 and when the right to amend 
bylaws has been granted to the directors, according to the court, the shareholders “will be 
bound by bylaws adopted unilaterally by their boards.”22 
 
The Boilermakers court emphasized the fact that, if the shareholders are displeased 
with the amended bylaw, they can either repeal the bylaw, adopt their own bylaw, or even 
remove directors from the board.23  Yet, the court imposed little restriction on the directors’ 
right to amend bylaws.24  But, does the adoption of contractarian principle, combined with 
the fact that shareholders granted the right to unilaterally amend bylaws, imply that there 
should be very little, if any, judicial check on the directors’ ability to unilaterally amend 
bylaws?  What if a controlling shareholder, with more than 50% voting power, were to 
adopt a bylaw?  To the extent that we apply the “contractual framework” to the charters 
and bylaws, what can we learn from how modification is treated under contract law?  What 
about its treatment of unilateral modifications?  What similarities or differences can we 
learn by comparing bylaws and charters with contracts?  Finally, as a matter of policy, 
should the directors or the shareholders be able to unilaterally amend bylaws with little or 
no oversight from the courts? 
 
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on these issues.  While the paper 
deals more generally with charter and bylaw amendments, its particular focus will be on 
unilateral bylaw amendments.  The paper foremost draws on how contract law deals with 
modifications and the problems that arise when one party grants the other the right to 
                                                 
20 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013).  After the decision, there was even a debate about whether the directors can 
adopt a mandatory arbitration provision in the bylaws.  See Claudia Allen, Bylaws Mandating Arbitration of 
Shareholder Disputes?, 39 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 751 (2015) and Lipton (2016) (analyzing the 
issues over mandatory arbitration clause in charters or bylaws and the problems of treating charters and 
bylaws literally as contracts).  The issue over mandatory arbitration bylaws became moot when the Delaware 
Legislature amended the corporate statutes to allow forum selection clauses which designate Delaware but 
not other forums, including arbitration.  See DGCL §115.  See also David Skeel, The Bylaw Puzzle in 
Delaware Corporate Law, 72 Business Lawyer 1 (2016) (arguing that the Delaware legislature’s decision to 
uphold an exclusive forum bylaw while disallowing a fee-shifting bylaw channelled more litigation back to 
Delaware, determining the direction of multi-forum litigation); and Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The 
Private Ordering Solution to Multiforum Shareholder Litigation, 14 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 31 
(2017) (empirically analyzes corporations that adopted exclusive forum provisions either in the charter or the 
bylaws). 
21 Id. at 955. 
22 Id. at 956.  According to the court, “a corporation’s bylaws are part of an inherently flexible contract 
between the stockholders and the corporation under which the stockholders have powerful rights they can 
use to protect themselves if they do not want board-adopted forum selection bylaws to be part of the contract 
between themselves and the corporation.” Id. 
23 According to the court, if shareholders disagree with a bylaw adopted by the directors, they can repeal it 
with their own resolution and, furthermore, discipline the directors by removing them from the board. Id.  
Unfortunately, however, there are substantial limitations, legal and practical, to the rights of shareholders in 
obtaining these remedies.  See infra note – and surrounding text. 
24 As mentioned below, under Delaware jurisprudence, bylaw amendments are subject to judicial scrutiny 
according to the degree that their purpose is determined “proper” and “equitable.”   Neither the Boilermakers 
court, nor the ATP Tour court applies this test in earnest.  See infra Part I. 
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unilaterally modify the contract.25  Briefly, under existing law, amending a contract is 
subject to various statutory and judicial restrictions.  Probably the most relevant contract 
doctrine applicable to charter and bylaw amendment is the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing.26  Contract modifications, including those that are “voluntarily” agreed to by both 
parties, must be done in “good faith” or be “fair and equitable.”27  Even when exercising a 
contractually granted right to unilaterally modify the contract, the party with the right must 
exercise it in good faith and must deal fairly with the counterparty.  While different courts 
have constituted this duty with different elements, in the context of unilateral 
modifications, the most common requirements include the obligation (1) to disclose the 
proposed modification to the counterparty; (2) to grant the right to opt out of the proposed 
modification (usually through termination of the contract); and (3) to not retroactively 
apply the modified provision. 
 
We then compare the rights of the contracting parties with those of the shareholders 
and uncovers several important factors that would make shareholders—minority 
shareholders, in particular—more vulnerable than contracting parties.  First, as noted by 
other scholars, even for charter (and bylaw) amendments that require express shareholder 
approval, for corporations with dispersed ownership, shareholders face the problems of 
collective action and rational apathy (or rational ignorance).28  When such problems 
                                                 
25 Coffee (1988) argued that we examine actual contract law to better understand a corporation’s opting out 
of default rules through charter amendments.  According to Coffee, “the risk of [managerial] opportunism is 
greatest when the charter provision is added by an amendment that shareholders do not fully understand,” 
and to guard against such opportunistic amendment, we could look at contract law’s regulation of 
modification, including Restatement (Second) of Contracts §89 that requires modification to be “fair and 
equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made.”  Id. at 938 – 
939.  We expand this approach to both charter and bylaw amendments and also, more specifically, to 
unilateral bylaw amendments. 
26 Good faith duty under contract law should be distinguished from directors’ good faith obligations to the 
corporation under corporate law.  See, e.g., Delaware General Corporation Law §102(b)(7).  There used to 
be some uncertainty in Delaware case law as to what the directors’ good faith obligation entails and whether 
the obligation is separate from the other fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.  Although, in theory, the courts 
could have harmonized the good faith obligation under corporate law with that under contract law, Delaware 
case law took a divergent approach by placing the good faith duty as part of the duty of loyalty.  See Stone 
v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (stating that “although good faith may be described colloquially as 
part of a ‘triad’ of fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and loyalty, the obligation to act in good 
faith does not establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as the duties of care 
and loyalty…[w]here directors fail to act in the face of a known duty to act, thereby demonstrating a 
conscious disregard for their responsibilities, they breach their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that 
fiduciary obligation in good faith.”)  See generally David Rosenberg, Making Sense of Good Faith in 
Delaware Corporate Fiduciary Law: A Contractarian Approach, 29 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 491 
(2004) on how Delaware courts have grappled with the “triad” fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good 
faith. 
27 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §89 and UCC §2-209.  See generally, Allan Farnsworth, Contracts 
(2004) at §4.22. 
28 See Bebchuk (1989) (noting how voting shareholders have little incentive to be informed over charter 
amendment proposals, for instance, by studying the lengthy proxy material, and would remain uninformed 
or under-informed).  See also Gordon (1989) (raising concerns over opportunistic mid-stream charter 
amendments due to collective action and other problems).  Romano (1989) and Coffee (1989) have noted 
that shareholders’ rational apathy does not necessarily mean that they will blindly vote in favor of 
management proposals.  The uninformed shareholders can, instead, vote against all management proposals 
Corporate Charters and Bylaws  August 16, 2017 
Page 8 of 31 
become severe, the process of shareholder approval provides little meaningful protection 
against managerial opportunism.  Similarly, when ownership is concentrated, for instance, 
with a controlling shareholder who has more than 50% of the voting rights, while the 
collective action and rational apathy problem for the shareholders as a class may be absent, 
minority shareholders (and possibly also the directors and the officers) may be harmed by 
the opportunism of the controlling shareholder. 
 
Second, particularly for publicly traded corporations, although the shareholders’ 
right to receive amendment notification is relatively well-enforced under federal securities 
laws, unlike in the contract setting, shareholders do not have the right to truly “terminate” 
their relationship with the corporation.  They can always sell their stock but the 
shareholder-corporation relationship remains preserved through the sale, and the 
corporation is not harmed—at least not directly or immediately—by the sale.  Third, the 
relationship between the managers and the shareholders (and between a controlling 
shareholder and the minority shareholders) is more “vertical” and “hierarchical,” based on 
a notion of agency, rather than “horizontal” and “arms-length,” based on contractual 
relationship.  Fourth, and more generally, whenever one party is granted the right to re-
adjust or modify the relationship, this presents the possible dangers of externality and hold-
up. 
 
Building on these differences, with the lessons learned from contract law, we argue 
that there is a policy-based justification to be more vigilant against charter and bylaw 
amendments and, in particular, against unilateral bylaw amendments.29  The policy goal 
should be to preserve flexibility in amending bylaws and charters while policing 
opportunism by managers and controlling shareholders.  The paper considers various 
policy instruments, including optional redemption, robust disclosure obligation, more 
reliance on shareholder voting and approval, and more judicial oversight.  After 
considering the costs and benefits, we suggest that the courts more vigorously apply the 
“proper” and “equitable” purpose or effect test under corporate law30 and, borrowing from 
                                                 
(they can “just say no”) or vote in favor of management proposals only some of the time (i.e., using a mixed 
strategy in game theory parlance).  If shareholders were to always vote against management proposals, there 
would be too much rigidity in charter provisions. 
29 The fact that the “contractual framework” is being applied to charters and bylaws does not mean that they 
should be literally treated as contracts subject to all doctrines of contract law.  As a matter of fact, it is likely 
infeasible to apply all contract law doctrines to corporate organizational documents.  See George Geis, Ex-
Ante Corporate Governance, 41 Journal of Corporation Law 609 (2016) (arguing that corporate law should 
not “outsource the resolution of ex-ante governance problems to generalized principles of contract law”) and 
Lipton (2016) (noting the dangers of treating charters and bylaws as contracts since the directors will be able 
to adopt mandatory arbitration provisions which must be enforced under the Federal Arbitration Act). 
30 See Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 407 (Del. 1985) (stating that “bylaws must be 
reasonable in their application” and holding that bylaw amendments, which required unanimous approval for 
any board action, among others, done for the purpose of avoiding a majority shareholder’s 
disenfranchisement, are valid) and Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 438—439 (Del. 1971) 
(holding that the directors’ amending the bylaws and advancing a shareholder meeting date “for the purpose 
of perpetuating itself in office…[and] for the purpose of obstructing the legitimate efforts of dissident 
stockholders in the exercise of their rights to undertake a proxy contest against management” is 
“inequitable”).  Although both Schnell and Franz Mfg. devised and applied the proper and equitable (or 
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contract law, apply the good faith and fair dealing obligations.31  With stronger judicial 
oversight, we argue, the benefits of flexibility can be preserved while value-destroying 
hold-up and externality (by managers’ or the controlling shareholder’s exercise of 
discretion in “bad faith”) can be better deterred. 
 
The paper is organized as follows.  Part I briefly reviews the statutory requirements 
of charter and bylaw amendments and recent developments in case law.  In so doing, the 
part highlights how the courts, especially those in Delaware, have become more disposed 
to apply the “contractarian” principle to charters and bylaws.  Part II focuses on the 
treatment of modifications and, in particular, change-of-terms clauses in contract law.  
While the courts have utilized various doctrines in imposing restrictions against possible 
abuse of the right of contract modification—such as unconscionability, illusory promise 
(indefiniteness), good faith and fair dealing, and different canons of construction—the part 
will focus primarily on the duty of good faith and fair dealing and show how the application 
of this principle has often led to the duty of disclosure combined with the right to terminate 
the contract (or opt out of proposed amendment).  Part III compares the contract law regime 
with the corporate law regime, highlighting important differences that can make 
shareholders more vulnerable to hold-up and counter-party opportunism.  Part IV shows 
how the courts can remedy the problem by more vigorously applying the “equitable” or 
“proper” purpose test as well as the good faith and fair dealing obligations to unilateral 
bylaw amendments.  By doing so, the paper argues, we not only advance the goal of 
preserving flexibility while policing opportunism (by the managers or the controlling 
shareholders), but also harmonize corporate law with the principles laid out in both contract 
law and agency law.  The last part concludes. 
 
I. Amending Charters and Bylaws under Corporate Law 
 
After a corporation comes into existence with its organizational documents, 
certificate or articles of incorporation (charter) and bylaws and issues stock, the corporation 
can subsequently amend those documents as the directors and the shareholders see fit, 
subject to certain restrictions.32  With respect to charters, both the Model Business 
                                                 
reasonable) test fairly vigorously, as we will argue in Part II, courts more recently seem to have stepped away 
from such vigorous application, if they applied the test, at all. 
While the proper and equitable purpose or reasonableness test was devised by the earlier cases of Schnell 
and Frantz Mfg., courts recently have applied it with much less vigor, if at all. 
31 While we are in favor of borrowing and applying the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing as 
a rule of interpretation, we do not advocate the wholesale incorporation of other contract law doctrines, such 
as unconscionability, indefiniteness, mutual assent, and various rules on remedy.  This is consistent with the 
agency law principles.  See Restatement (Third) of Agency §8.07 cmt. b (stating that “contract law principles 
of general applicability govern whether such agreements are enforceable and how they are to be interpreted, 
among other questions.”).  Coffee (1989) has made a similar argument in favor of judicial activism.  
According to Coffee, “judicial activism is the necessary complement to contractual freedom” and comparing 
a corporation to a long-term, relational contract, “the court’s role becomes that of preventing one party from 
exercising powers delegated to it for the mutual benefit of all shareholders for purely self-interested ends.” 
Id. at 1621. 
32 At minimum, charter provisions must be “lawful” and “proper to insert in an original certificate of 
incorporation filed at the time of the amendment.”  See Delaware General Corporation Law §242(a).  The 
case law has also ruled that the charter and bylaw provisions must be consistent with public policy. 
Corporate Charters and Bylaws  August 16, 2017 
Page 10 of 31 
Corporation Act and Delaware General Corporation Law mandate a set of procedures that 
must be satisfied when a corporation wants to amend its charter.33  For instance, under 
DGCL §242, only the directors can make a proposal to amend the charter34 and, except for 
a small number of provisions, shareholders must expressly approve the proposal for the 
amendment to be effective.35  Furthermore, under Delaware statute, if a proposed 
amendment falls under one of three special categories, the most important of which is 
“adversely” affecting a class (or series) of shares, the affected class (or series) will get to 
vote on the amendment separately as a class.36  Finally, neither the directors nor the 
shareholders can unilaterally amend the charter. 
 
Amending bylaws, however, is a different matter.  The Model Business Corporation 
Act vests both the directors and the shareholders with the power to amend bylaws.  MBCA 
§10.20(b) allows directors to amend the bylaws unless (1) the articles of incorporation 
reserve that power solely to the shareholders or (2) the shareholders amend the bylaw in 
question and stipulate in the bylaw that the directors cannot thereafter amend it.37  For 
Delaware corporations, the right to amend bylaws belongs to the shareholders but it can be 
granted to the directors through a provision in the charter.  Delaware General Corporation 
Law §109(a) states that “the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the 
stockholders entitled to vote…Notwithstanding the foregoing, any corporation may, in its 
certificate of incorporation, confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the 
directors….”38  The statute, at the same time, imposes two important restrictions on the 
directors’ power.  First, it expressly preserves the right of the shareholders to amend 
bylaws, which, with certain limitations, allows them to repeal or amend board-adopted 
                                                 
33 For a more detailed analysis of charter amendments, see Min (2018). 
34 Delaware General Corporation Law §242(b)(1) states that the corporation’s “board of directors shall adopt 
a resolution setting forth the amendment proposed, declaring its advisability, and either calling a special 
meeting of stockholders entitled to vote…or directing that the amendment proposed be considered at the next 
annual meeting of the stockholders.” 
35 See Delaware General Corporation Law §242.  Charter amendment is considered to be a “fundamental” 
change to the corporation, thereby requiring shareholder approval.  See also Model Business Corporation Act 
§10. 
36 See Delaware General Corporation Law §242(b)(2).  The other two categories that require a class vote are: 
(1) changing the number of authorized shares and (2) changing the par value of the stock.  With respect to 
changing the number of authorized stock, however, if the original charter or the charter amendment that 
created the stock so provides, all shareholders can vote as a single class.  In addition to section 242, there is 
another way of amending the charter, through merger (“amendment through merger”).  See Delaware General 
Corporation Law §251(3).  Unlike §242(b), however, §251(e) does not mandate a class vote even when a 
certain class is adversely affected. 
37 See Model Business Corporation Act §10.20. 
38 See Delaware General Corporation Law §109(a).  Amending bylaws is one of the few actions that the 
shareholders can initiate under Delaware law.  Most of other “fundamental” changes to the corporation, such 
as charter amendment, merger, and sale of all or substantially all of the assets, expressly require a board 
resolution.  See, e.g., DGCL §§242(b), 251(b), and 271(a).  See Stephen Bainbridge, Who Can Amend 
Corporate Bylaws, Professor Bainbridge Blog (January 5, 2006) available at 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2006/01/who-can-amend-corporate-
bylaws.html. 
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bylaws.39  Section 109(a) of the Delaware statute states, “[t]he fact that such power has 
been so conferred upon the directors…shall not divest the stockholders…of the power, nor 
limit their power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws.”40  Second, there are substantive and 
hierarchical limitations.  Section 109(b) states, “[t]he bylaws may contain any provision, 
not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of 
the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or power or the rights or power of 
its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.”41  As such, the bylaw must be consistent 
with state law and the corporation’s charter and must relate to the “business” or “affairs” 
of the corporation or the rights of various constituents. 
 
With respect to the first limitation, while, in theory, deciding whether the directors 
should have the power to unilaterally amend the bylaws is up to the shareholders, in 
practice, almost all publicly traded corporations incorporated in Delaware have such a 
granting clause in their charters.42  This is not surprising.  Perhaps, directors should have 
the right to amend the bylaws as necessary, considering that most corporate charters do not 
contain detailed provisions relating to the business or affairs of the corporation, nor do they 
stipulate the rights of various investors and other constituents.  Ultimately, it is the directors 
who have the  authority to manage “the business and affairs” of the corporation.43  
Furthermore, given that amending the charter is time-consuming and costly, due largely to 
the obligation of convening a shareholders’ meeting, granting such a right to the directors 
can better preserve the flexibility for the corporation for unforeseen future contingencies 
and circumstances.  At the same time, this also creates a danger that the directors, as agents 
of the corporation and the shareholders, may abuse that discretion to the detriment of the 
corporation and its shareholders.  As a matter of theory, it is unclear how much discretion 
should be given to directors and what types of procedural or substantive checks must be 
imposed. 
 
Recently, courts, especially those in Delaware, have moved towards granting more 
freedom to the directors in unilaterally amending the bylaws.  The theory is that the bylaws, 
along with the charters, constitute a “contract” between the corporation and shareholders 
                                                 
39 Because Delaware law does not expressly stipulate that shareholders have the power to limit the board’s 
right to amend (or repeal) shareholder-adopted bylaws, some commentators have noted that this raises the 
possibility of “cycling amendments and counter-amendments.”  Id.  However, once the charter expressly 
grants directors the right to unilaterally amend bylaws, if shareholders were to try, through a provision in the 
bylaws, to prevent the board from amending or repealing shareholder-adopted bylaw, such a restriction would 
be inconsistent with the charter and likely invalid.  See Hamermesh (1998).  See also Airgas, Inc. v. Air 
Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A3d 1182 (Del. 2010) (invalidating a bylaw provision that advanced a shareholder 
meeting because it is inconsistent with the staggered board provision in the charter).  There also are other 
legal and practical limitations.  For instance, shareholders cannot adopt a bylaw that would interfere with the 
board’s ability to manage the affairs of the corporation under DGCL §141(a).  See Lawrence Hamermesh, 
Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 Tulane Law Review 
409 (1998), Gordon Smith, Matthew Right & Marcus Hintze, Private Ordering and Shareholder Bylaws, 80 
Fordham Law Review 125 (2011), and Fisch (2018). 
40 Id. 
41 See Delaware General Corporation Law §109(b). 
42 See Min (2018). 
43 See Delaware General Corporation Law §141(a). 
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(and, also, among the shareholders).44  Once the shareholders grant the right to unilaterally 
amend bylaws to the directors (under DGCL §109(a)), the directors can go ahead and 
exercise that right.  Under the theory, the shareholders have, at least implicitly, agreed to 
such unilateral changes by including the granting provision in the charter45 and, if 
shareholders are displeased with such changes, they can either take the right away by 
amending the charter or, possibly, by unilaterally repealing or amending the bylaw 
provision adopted by directors.46  In theory, the shareholders have procedural mechanisms 
to protect their rights against potential abuse by the board.  And, perhaps such mechanisms 
require little or no judicial oversight: shareholders and directors should be able to “privately 
order” their affairs with minimal intervention from courts. 
 
Directors have indeed been fairly active in deploying this power.  Recently, they 
have unilaterally amended bylaws to include: (1) advance notice provisions requiring 
shareholders to provide detailed notice to the board about their upcoming proposals 
(including possible proxy fights) during a specified window before the shareholders 
meeting; (2) exclusive forum provisions requiring prospective plaintiff-shareholders to 
bring corporate law-based suit only in Delaware; (3) special shareholder meeting 
provisions that allow only a shareholder with substantial share ownership (often 5% or 
more) to call a special shareholders’ meeting; and (4) fee-shifting provisions that require 
non-prevailing shareholder to reimburse all the fees and expenses that the corporation and 
its directors have incurred in dispute.47 
 
Though it was initially uncertain whether such bylaw provisions would be upheld 
by the court, Delaware courts have become more lenient towards directors.  The case of 
Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp.,48 is exemplary.  The directors 
of Chevron and FedEx adopted exclusive forum bylaws that required shareholders to 
                                                 
44 Once we determine that the charters and bylaws constitute a “contract” among the shareholders, directors, 
and the corporation, it seems appropriate to deal with the scope and content of such “contractual” obligations 
using the principles of contract law rather than those of fiduciary law.  For instance, in terms of interpreting 
the provisions of charters or bylaws, the directors (and the shareholders) would be subject to the interpretation 
rules of contract law.  Although corporate law is unclear on this issue, this approach is taken in agency law.  
See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Agency §§8.07 and 8.13.  According to the official comment b to §8.07, 
“[a]lthough a contract is not necessary to create a relationship of agency, many agents and principals enter 
into agreements.  Contract-law principles of general applicability govern whether such agreements are 
enforceable and how they are to be interpreted, among other questions.”  If, on the other hand, we were to 
apply fiduciary obligations, unilateral bylaw amendments are most likely to receive the protection of the 
business judgment rule, unless heightened judicial scrutiny, such as the entire fairness rule or the Unocal 
proportionality test, apply.  With business judgment rule protection, because the plaintiff-shareholders must 
show that the directors were “grossly negligent” when amending the bylaws, this seems more deferential to 
the directors’ decisions than the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
45 The Chancery Court in Boilermakers called this an “implied consent.” 73 A.2d at 955 – 956.  Obviously, 
how “consent” has been given by the shareholders to the directors is an open question.  As we will see shortly, 
the courts treat this as a question of interpretation in change-of-terms contract disputes. 
46 See supra note – on legal and practical limitations on shareholders’ ability to amend or repeal board-
adopted bylaw. 
47 For an overview of recently contested bylaws, see Hamermesh (2014), Choi (2018), Min (2018), and Fisch 
(2018). 
48 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
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initiate corporate law-based litigation only in Delaware.49  In relevant parts, the bylaw 
stated: 
 
Unless the Corporation consents in writing to the selection of an alternative 
forum, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware shall be the sole and 
exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or proceeding brought on 
behalf of the Corporation, (ii) any action asserting a claim of breach of 
fiduciary duty owed by any director, officer or other employee of the 
Corporation to the Corporation or the Corporation’s stockholders, (iii) any 
action asserting a claim arising pursuant to any provision of the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, or (iv) any action asserting a claim governed by 
the internal affairs doctrine.  Any person or entity purchasing or otherwise 
acquiring any interest in shares of capital stock of the Corporation shall be 
deemed to have notice of and consented to the provisions of this [bylaw].50 
 
Without the application of such a bylaw, shareholders, presumably, would be able to bring 
suit against the corporation or the directors (and officers) under the rules of civil procedure.  
Traditionally, such suits were usually brought either in the state of incorporation or the 
state where the corporation’s headquarters is located, or both.51 
 
When the exclusive forum bylaw was challenged by shareholders, the Chancery 
Court upheld its facial validity.  The court reasoned that, “the bylaws constitute a binding 
part of the contract between a Delaware corporation and its stockholders, and the bylaw 
dealing with litigation forum is a proper subject matter under Delaware General 
Corporation Law §109(b).52  The court then reasoned that when the shareholders grant the 
right to unilaterally amend the bylaws to the directors in the charter, they have “assented 
to a contractual framework established by the DGCL and the certificate of incorporation 
that explicitly recognizes that stockholders will be bound by bylaws adopted unilaterally 
by their boards,” and “[u]nder that clear contractual framework, the stockholders assent to 
not having to assent to board-adopted bylaws.”53 (Emphasis added.)  According to the 
court, in case the shareholders are displeased with a board-adopted bylaw, instead of filing 
a shareholder lawsuit, they can either repeal or amend the board-adopted bylaw or even 
                                                 
49 While both Chevron and FedEx conduct business throughout the US and many parts of the world, Chevron 
is headquartered in California, while FedEx is headquartered in Tennessee.  Both stocks are listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange. 
50 Id. at 942. 
51 Citation needed. 
52 Boilermakers, at 955. 
53 Id. at 956.  In an earlier case, the federal district court in California ruled that unilaterally adopted forum 
selection bylaw is invalid under the principles of contract law.  Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F.Supp.2d 1170 (N.D. 
CA 2011).  The Galaviz court stated that: “under contract law, a party’s consent to a written agreement may 
serve as consent to all the terms therein, whether or not all of them were specifically negotiated or even read, 
but it does not follow that a contracting party may thereafter unilaterally add or modify contractual 
provisions.”  Id. at 1174.  The Boilermakers court criticized this reasoning, stating that the conclusion “rests 
on a failure to appreciate the contractual framework established by the DGCL for Delaware corporations and 
their stockholders.”  Boilermakers, at 956. 
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remove the directors at the next shareholders’ meeting.54  The reasoning strongly implies 
that the dispute over board-adopted bylaws should be resolved in the boardroom rather than 
in the courtroom. 
 
Furthermore, even though the court mentioned that the bylaws should be 
“interpreted using contractual principles,”55 the cases the court mainly relied on were a few 
U.S. Supreme Court cases, The Bremen v. Zapata Off-shore Co.56 and Carnival Cruise 
Line v. Shute,57 which validated forum selection clauses with only passing references to 
contract law doctrines.  Citing Bremen, the Boilermakers court stated that the forum 
selection clauses are valid, so long as they are “unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or 
overweening bargaining power” and that the provisions “should be enforced unless 
enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be ‘unreasonable.’”58  Hence, while there 
was some attempt to examine both the procedural and substantive aspects of the adoption 
of the forum selection bylaw, examining the issues of “fraud, undue influence, or 
overweening bargaining power” and whether the enforcement of the provision would be 
“unreasonable” would still leave directors plenty of latitude.59  In fact, in ATP Tour Inc. v. 
Deutscher Tennis Bund,60 the case that validated fee-shifting bylaws, there was little 
                                                 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 957. 
56 407 U.S. 1, 92 S. Ct. 1907 (1972). 
57 499 U.S. 585, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991). 
58 Id. citing Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10. 
59 The Boilermakers court does not apply the proper or equitable purpose test to forum selection bylaws, 
except to state that: “the plaintiff may sue in her preferred forum and respond to the defendant’s motion to 
dismiss for improper venue by arguing that...the forum selection clause should not be respected because its 
application would be unreasonable.  The plaintiff may also argue that…the forum selection clause should not 
be enforced because the bylaw was being used for improper purposes inconsistent with the directors’ 
fiduciary duties.”  See 73 A.3d 934 at 958 (Del. Ch. 2013).  The court also states that the bylaws are presumed 
to be valid and to successfully challenge the “facial statutory and contractual validity of the bylaws,” the 
plaintiffs must show that “the bylaws cannot operate lawfully or equitably under any circumstances.” 
(emphasis original).  See 73 A.3d 934 at 948 (Del. Ch. 2013).  The ATP Tour court similarly states: the fact 
that “under some circumstances, a bylaw might conflict with a statute, or operate unlawfully, is not a ground 
for finding it facially invalid.” 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2013).  The analysis, however, is in tension with an 
earlier ruling by the Delaware Supreme Court.  In CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, the 
Delaware Supreme Court struck down a bylaw that would require reimbursement of proxy expenses (even 
by those waging proxy fights against the incumbent directors) by finding that complying with the bylaw will 
lead to a breach of directors’ fiduciary duties under “at least one…hypothetical.” 953 A.2d 227, 238 (Del. 
2008).  This paper is certainly not arguing that the exclusive forum bylaw, or any other unilaterally adopted 
bylaws, is unreasonable and should be prohibited.  The paper’s main argument focuses more on advocating 
for the judicial oversight on unilaterally adopted bylaws. 
60 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2013).  While the ATP Tour court does mention the requirement that the amendment 
must be done for a “proper” or “equitable” purpose (and effect), it does not delve into more details about the 
purpose behind the fee-shifting bylaws.  According to the court, “the enforceability of a facially valid bylaw 
may turn on the circumstances surrounding its adoption and use,” but the certification from the US Third 
Circuit Court “dos not provide the stipulated facts necessary to determine whether the ATP bylaw was 
enacted for a proper purpose or properly applied.” See 91 A.3d 554, 559 (Del. 2014).  The court nevertheless 
states that the “intent to deter [shareholder] litigation…is not invariably an improper purpose.” Id. at 560. 
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mention of whether the bylaws should be examined under the principles of contract, even 
though the decision relied heavily on the “contractarian principle.”61 
 
II. Bilateral and Unilateral Modifications under Contract Law 
 
The adoption of the contractarian principle to the charters and bylaws naturally 
leads us to think about how modification of such “contracts” would be dealt with under 
contract law.  In particular, with respect to bylaws, granting directors the right to amend 
bylaws is akin to giving one party the right to unilaterally amend (or modify) the contract.62  
These are often called “change-of-terms” clauses, and such provisions are prevalent 
particularly in consumer and employment contracts, including credit card agreements and 
end user license agreements (EULAs).  They are also visible in agreements among 
commercially sophisticated entities.63  Under contract law, modification, in general, raises 
at least two important issues: (1) whether the parties have assented to the modification (so 
called the “manifestation of mutual assent” requirement);64 and (2) whether a modification 
is “fair and equitable” or made “in good faith.”65 
 
The change-of-terms clause, in addition, raises at least four issues: (1) whether the 
right is so open-ended as to make the contract (or the “promise”) illusory or too indefinite; 
(2) whether the right grants too much power to one party so as to make the term 
unconscionable; (3) what the parties might have intended by granting one party to 
unilaterally modify the contract; and (4) in case the right is exercised, whether the exercise 
is in “good faith.”66  This section will illustrate that cobbling together different doctrinal 
                                                 
61 There are a few areas in which a bylaw amendment will be subject a heightened judicial scrutiny.  If the 
directors were adopting a bylaw, say, with an anti-takeover feature against a hostile takeover attempt, the 
bylaw amendment will be scrutinized under the Unocal proportionality standard.  Also, if the directors are 
deemed to interfere with the shareholder franchise, the bylaw will be subject to the Blasius compelling 
justification test. 
62 An important difference between contract and corporate regimes is that under contract law, unless contract 
stipulates otherwise, no party is given the right to unilaterally modify the contract.  By contrast, under 
corporate law, shareholders always have the right to unilaterally modify bylaws.  Technically, there is also a 
difference between having a change-in-terms clause in a contract versus a right to unilaterally amend bylaws 
in the charter, since the relationship between the charter and the bylaws is hierarchical.  We doubt, however, 
that these differences would matter much, unless the bylaw provision in question is in conflict with the 
charter.  For instance, even if the statute would have allowed a granting clause to be contained in the 
shareholder-approved bylaws, rather than the charter, unless there is another provision in the charter with 
which it conflicts, it seems unlikely that the court would have come to a different conclusion. 
63 The most common commercial agreements that allow one party to dictate the terms of the transaction are 
output and requirements contracts as well as open-price contracts, which allow either the buyer or the seller 
to determine, ex post, the quantity or price of the good to be produced.  See Uniform Commercial Code §2-
306 and 2-209. 
64 See DeMott (2015) and Lipton (2016) on the problems of constructing “consent” (or the manifestation of 
mutual assent) in the case of corporate charter and bylaw amendments. 
65 Fair and equitable requirement is imposed by the Restatement while the Uniform Commercial Code uses 
the good faith approach.  See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §89 and UCC §2-209. 
66 There also is a question of whether there is mutual assent to the unilateral modification.  This issue arises 
most often with respect to consumer contracts, when the notification is sent through a bill stuffer.  One reason 
why the courts often required a meaningful opt out (or termination) was to satisfy the mutual assent 
requirement.  See generally Peter Alces & Michael Greenfield, They Can Do What!? Limitations on the Use 
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frameworks under contract law, courts have imposed a substantial restriction on how the 
contractually granted right can be exercised. 
 
A. Illusory Promise and Indefiniteness 
 
On the issue of whether a change-of-term provision constitutes an “illusory” 
promise, under contract law, granting one contracting party too much flexibility can lead 
to a lack of commitment, which is essential for there to be a contract.67  The unilateral right 
to amend a contract can raise an analogous problem.68  When the parties expressly include 
certain obligations, such as advance written notice, courts have held that such an obligation 
will no longer make the unilateral modification clause illusory.69  Even without any express 
obligation, courts have, in other circumstances, attempted to solve this issue by imposing 
certain obligations, such as the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.70  In other 
areas of contract law, the duty of good faith and fair dealing is expressly required by statute.  
The primary example comes from the requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code on 
output and open-price contracts,71 under which one of the parties has the right to set either 
the quantity or the price term.  The Uniform Commercial Code imposes an obligation to 
set the price and quantity terms in “good faith.”72  Because the duty of “good faith” is an 
obligation, this also presumably solves the illusory promise problem. 
 
B. Unconscionability 
 
The doctrine of unconscionability is another line of attack often been used by 
plaintiffs against the change-of-terms clauses.  If a court finds a contract term 
                                                 
of Change-of-Terms Clauses, 26 Georgia State University Law Review 1099 (2010); Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin 
Davis, Empty Promises, 84 Southern California Law Review 1 (2010) and David Horton, The Shadow Terms: 
Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA Law Review 605 (2010).  The papers ultimately 
argue for a statutory mechanism to deal with commercial entities arbitrarily modifying their contracts with 
consumers.  See also Michael DeMichele & Richard Bales, Unilateral-Modification Provision in 
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 24 Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal 63 (2006). 
67 Contract requires a promise and for there to be a promise, there has to be some sort of a “commitment” by 
the promisor.  See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§1 and 2.  When there is no commitment and 
therefore, no promise, the contract also lacks consideration.  Accordingly, some courts treat the illusory 
promise problem as a lack of consideration problem.  See infra note 67. 
68 See, e.g., Cheek v. United Healthcare of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc., 378 Md. 139 (2003) (finding a change-of-
terms clause in an employee handbook illusory and declining to enforce an arbitration clause later added by 
the employer); Floss v. Ryan’s Family Steak House, Inc., 211 F.3d 306 (2000); and Dumais v. American 
Golf Corp., 299 F.3d 1216 (2002). 
69 See Pearson’s Pharmacy, Inc. v. Express Scripts, Inc., 2009 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 100915 (2009) (the change-
of-terms clause required Express Scripts to provide written notice of any modifications and to give the 
pharmacy an option to terminate the contract if they disagreed with the changes) and  Morrison v. Circuit 
City Stores, Inc., 70 F.Supp.2d 815 (1999) (change-of-terms clause with an obligation to give advance notice 
and the right could be exercised only at certain times of the year). 
70 See Fagerstrom v. Amazon.com, Inc., 141 F.Supp.3d 1051 (2015) (declaring that an arbitration agreement 
that contained a right of unilateral modification is not illusory because Amazon was bound by the duty of 
good faith “to act within the common purpose of the agreement and to the justified expectations of the 
customers”). 
71 See UCC §2-306 for output and requirements contracts and §2-305 for open-price contracts. 
72 Id. 
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“unconscionable,” the court can strike it from the contract, modify the term, or even declare 
the entire contract unenforceable.73  The change-of-terms clause can be subject to 
unconscionability analysis because one party is given a (much) more favorable deal to the 
possible detriment of the other.  To prevail on an unconscionability claim, the claimant 
must show that (1) the term is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable; and (2) 
the unconscionability was present at the time of the contract’s formation.74  Because the 
second prong requires a demonstration of unconscionability at the time of formation, some 
courts have applied the doctrine to resolve the question of whether the change-of-terms 
clause itself is unconscionable.75  Others have been willing to apply to the time of 
modification, reasoning that formation and modification raise similar issues.76  If this were 
so, the plaintiff must show that the modification (and not the initial formation) was both 
procedurally and substantively unconscionable.  With respect to the latter, the plaintiff 
must show that the modified term is unreasonably favorable to the modifying party.  This 
is very much an open question, and the courts will likely grapple with whether the modified 
term will have an unreasonably favorable effect for the plaintiff.  More importantly, the 
plaintiff will also have to show that the amendment process itself was procedurally 
unconscionable.  In many ways, this inquiry is similar to that into whether the modification 
was done in “good faith.” 
 
C. Interpretation 
 
Some courts have raised the issues of interpretation and ex ante intent with respect 
to change-of-terms clauses.  Basically, when one party grants the other the right to modify 
the contract, this can raise the question of ex ante intent, such as what degree of discretion 
the contracting parties intended and whether the altered term falls within that expectation.  
The case of Badie v. Bank of America illustrates this dilemma.77  The case dealt with credit 
card agreements between the plaintiff-consumers and Bank of America.  The original 
agreement contained a change-of-terms clause which, in relevant parts, stated: 
 
We May Change or Terminate Any Terms, Conditions, Services or Features 
of Your Account (Including increasing Your Finance Charges) at Any 
Time.  We May Impose Any Change in Terms on Your Outstanding 
Balance, as Well as on Subsequent Transactions and Balances.  We may 
also add new terms, conditions, services or features to your Account.  To 
the extent required by law, we will notify you in advance of any change in 
terms by mailing a notice to you at your address as shown on our records. 
                                                 
73 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §208 and UCC §2-302. 
74 Id. 
75  See, e.g., Flemma v. Halliburton Energy Services, 2013-NMSC-022 (2013) (finding an employment 
contract that contained a change-of-terms clause unconscionable because it was unreasonably favorable to 
the company).  But see Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 73 N.Y.2d 1 (1988) (finding that a change-of-
terms clause in a credit card agreement is not unconscionable because the term was normal in the industry). 
76 See Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570 (1991) (stating that the exercise of change-of-terms clause 
by including an arbitration clause is unconscionable because the clause is added without a bargain, and the 
counterparty did not have an opt out option, creating an absence of meaningful choice). 
77 67 Cal. App. 4th 779 (Ct. App. CA 1998). 
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Subsequent to opening the credit card accounts, Bank of America attempted to insert a 
mandatory arbitration clause into the agreement by mailing half-page bill stuffers to its 
customers. 
 
The Badie court determined that inserting the mandatory arbitration clause raised 
an issue of interpretation, in addition to other contract law issues, such as 
unconscionability, good faith and fair dealing.78  Bank of America argued that the change-
of-terms provision authorized any modification whatsoever, but the court disagreed.  
According to the court, the only “terms” actually included into the original agreement 
pertained to “percentage rates for purchases, various fees, the method of computing 
balance, and the grace period.”79  While the broadly worded change-of-terms clause 
supported the Bank’s interpretation (that they could subsequently add the mandatory 
arbitration clause), the court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ narrow interpretation that the 
“terms” of the original agreement do not include issues of dispute resolution.  Between 
these two possible interpretations of the clause, the court ultimately determined that the 
plaintiffs’ more narrow interpretation was more reasonable, and therefore, the Bank could 
not unilaterally impose a mandatory arbitration clause.80 
 
D. Implied Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
 
At a high level of generality, all contracts require the contracting parties to exercise 
“good faith” in both performance and enforcement of the contract.81  Furthermore, the 
application of good faith usually presumes that there is some discretionary component in 
the performance of the contractual obligations.  So, sometimes the court will say that a 
party has to exercise “good faith” in the discretion granted under contract.  This principle 
is applicable to the case of unilateral modification.  While the precise contours of what 
exactly “good faith” obligation entails is unclear, with respect to unilateral modifications, 
case law suggests that the courts have required a (different) combination of (1) a notice 
provision which obligates the amending party to notify the counterparty about the proposed 
amendment several days prior; (2) a termination or opt-out right, allowing the counterparty 
to terminate the agreement if she does not agree with the proposed amendment; and (3) a 
non-retroactive application provision.82  If we were to apply all three prongs, the modifying 
                                                 
78 Id. at 798. 
79 Id. at 799. 
80 Id. at 805 – 806. 
81 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §205 states: “every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good 
faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”  Official comment a refers to the good faith 
definitions in the Uniform Commercial Code.  UCC §1-201(19) defines “good faith” as “honesty in fact in 
the conduct or transaction concerned” and, with respect to merchants, UCC §2-103(1)(b) defines good faith 
to be “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.”  
The comment goes on to state that: “the phrase ‘good faith’ is used in a variety of contexts, and its meaning 
varies somewhat with the context.” 
82 See, e.g., Badie v. Bank of America, 67 Ca. App. 4th 779 (Cal. App. 1998) (applying the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing principle to unilateral insertion of arbitration clause in credit card agreements); 
and In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566 (Texas 2002) (imposing opt out right and prohibiting retroactive 
application).  Allowing consumers to have the chance to opt out by terminating the contract has been deemed 
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party must, first, give advance notice to the counterparty; second, allow the counterparty 
to terminate the contractual relationship (or opt out of the proposed modification); and 
third, make sure that the modified term will not apply retroactively. 
 
III. Change-of-Terms Clause vs. Right to Unilaterally Amend Bylaws 
 
Under the current system, unilateral bylaw amendments are at least facially similar 
to unilateral contract modifications in a few procedural dimensions.  First, with respect to 
publicly traded corporations83 subject to the federal securities regulations, the directors 
have an obligation to notify shareholders of the bylaw amendment through an 8-K filing.84  
Furthermore, because 8-K filings are public, the disclosure of bylaw amendment through 
8-K is arguably more effective than contract modification disclosure through bill stuffers, 
as is often done in consumer contracts.  Second, if shareholders find the bylaw amendment 
unattractive, they can “terminate” their relationship with the corporation by selling their 
stock.  Presumably this termination right is strongest for public corporations whose stock 
is actively traded on a national exchange, such as the New York Stock Exchange and 
NASDAQ.  Third, although the existing case law is not entirely clear, it is unlikely that the 
courts will allow directors to apply the amended bylaw retroactively against shareholders, 
probably as a matter of public policy.85 
                                                 
to better satisfy the requirement of mutual assent to the proposed unilateral amendment.  See Stiles v. Home 
Cable Concepts, 994 F.Supp. 1410 (1998).  The non-retroactivity clause combined with notice provision is 
often called the “Halliburton savings clause.”  See In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566 (Texas 2002) 
(applying Texas contract law and general contract principles to uphold an arbitration clause unilaterally 
adopted by an employer) and In re 24R, Inc., 324 S.W.3d 564 (explaining that the Halliburton court “held 
that because the [amended arbitration agreement] contained a ‘savings clause’—including a ten-day notice 
provision and a provision that any amendments would only apply prospectively—that prevented the 
employer from avoiding its promise, the arbitration agreement was not illusory”).  The relevant portion of 
the amended arbitration clause in the Halliburton case stated that, “no amendment shall apply to a Dispute of 
which…[employer] had actual notice on the date of amendment.”  Id. at 569 – 570.  See Nelson v. Watch 
House Int’l, LLC., 815 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 2016) for a recent application of the Halliburton savings clause.  
In credit card contracts, federal law prohibits or substantially restricts retroactive application.  See Alces & 
Greenfield (2010) at 1143 – 1144 (describing the Credit CARD Act prohibits retroactive changes in the 
annual percentage rate while giving the creditor limited permission to increase the rate applicable to existing 
balances when the consumer defaults by being late for more than 60 days). 
83 It is unclear what disclosure obligations there are with respect to privately held corporations.  In Delaware, 
there is no statutory obligation to disclose bylaw amendments.  Instead, presumably, such obligation is likely 
to be part of directors’ fiduciary obligation to the corporation and its shareholders.  This is sometimes called 
the duty of candor. 
84 Securities and Exchange Act §13 requires firms subject to the federal securities laws to make filings, 
including periodic reports, with the SEC to keep investors up to date.  General instructions to Form 8-K, as 
adopted by the SEC under the Exchange Act §13, require the reporting firm to file Form 8-K with the SEC.  
As one of the events that must be disclosed through an 8-K, Item 5.03(a) includes both charter and bylaw 
amendments. 
85 There is question over what retroactive application means.  One possibility is by looking at the timing 
when the cause of action arose.  For instance, if it arose before the company adopted an exclusive forum 
clause, shareholders should not be subject to the bylaw.  This raises the issue of whether the presence of a 
cause of action creates a “vested right” for the (future) plaintiff.  Another, somewhat narrower approach is to 
look at the time of (constructive) notice of the lawsuit.  If, for instance, shareholders file the lawsuit or give 
notice to the company of their intention to do so before the bylaws are amended, the lawsuit will not be 
subject to the bylaw.  This was the approach used in Halliburton.  See supra note --. 
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Even with respect to notification and termination rights, however, there are 
important differences, which make the rights of shareholders substantially weaker.  First, 
unlike contract modifications, notice of bylaw amendments, as required under the federal 
securities laws, is ex post: by the time the notice is given to shareholders, the amendments 
have already taken place and are effective.  Even under the federal securities regulation, 
there is no requirement for the directors to notify shareholders of bylaw amendment 
proposals before the amendments become effective.86  Second, as noted by other scholars 
in charter amendment settings,87 the presence of an actively trading market, combined with 
the ex post notification feature, imply that even if a shareholder were to “terminate” her 
relationship with the corporation by selling her shares, when the amended bylaw is 
unattractive for the shareholders, the share price would already be depressed by the time 
of sale.  The damage is already done by the time the shareholder exercises her termination 
right.88 
 
Third, and most importantly, shareholders do not have a meaningful right to opt out 
or terminate the relationship.  Foremost, given that charters and bylaws affect all 
shareholders (and the corporation) and given the importance of preserving homogeneity, 
granting individual shareholder (or even individual shares) the right to opt out of 
amendments would be practically (if not legally) impossible.89  With respect to the right to 
terminate, when a shareholder sells her shares after the bylaw amendment, the corporation 
does not incur a loss, since the shareholder will be selling her shares to new investors rather 
than back to the corporation.90  By contrast, in a contract setting, when the counterparty 
terminates the contract either before or after the contract modification, the party that 
modifies the contract will lose the contractual surplus that the party was expecting to realize 
                                                 
86 Under the 8-K instructions, firms must report certain events, including charter and bylaw amendments, 
within four business days after the occurrence of certain events. 
87 See Easterbrook (1989) and Bebchuk (1989). 
88 There also is a countervailing element that makes the shareholder’s right, vis-à-vis that of a contracting 
party, more robust.  If we assume that the stock price represents the present value of the future “surplus” 
(e.g., dividends) that the shareholders expect to receive, selling it to a third party allows the shareholder to 
capitalize the (reduced) surplus.  By contrast, when a contracting party terminates the contract, ordinarily, 
the terminating party does not receive anything, unless stipulated otherwise in the contract, from the 
counterparty.  Tradable stock makes it easier for the shareholder to “terminate” the relationship. 
89 One way of giving differential rights to the shareholders is by creating different classes of stock (Common 
A, Common B, Preferred A, Preferred B, etc.) and tailoring each class’s rights.  But, of course, within each 
class, the same charter and bylaw provisions apply. 
90 This is true even when the proposed bylaw amendment destroys value and reduces the share price.  By 
contrast, when a corporation is selling stock with undesirable bylaw provisions, presumably the price that the 
investors will be willing to pay will decrease, which, in turn, reduces the amount of proceeds that the 
corporation gets.  Therefore, at least in theory, the concerns over opportunistic or self-serving bylaw or 
charter amendments are greater when done “mid-stream” (that is, after the corporation has already received 
the proceeds from sale) rather than at the initial (or secondary) public offering.  See Coffee (1989) and Gordon 
(1989).  At the same time, however, there is doubt as to whether the initial public offering, presumably 
through its pricing mechanism, can effectively prevent seemingly inefficient charter or bylaw provisions. See 
Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in 
IPOs, 17 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 83 (2001) (documenting how many firms adopt anti-
takeover devices at the time of their initial public offering). 
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in the future.  A shareholder selling her shares (through market trading) is akin to a party 
to a contract transferring her rights (either through delegation or assignment) to a third 
party rather than terminating the contract.  In a market trading of stock, the relationship 
between a corporation and a shareholder is preserved and only the identity of the 
shareholders changes.  If we are serious about achieving symmetry, shareholders should 
be able to get their shares redeemed by the corporation.  The fact that the corporation does 
not suffer a loss when a shareholder sells is important for deterrence and incentive reasons.  
In a contract setting, if a party thinking about modifying the contract is concerned about 
possible contract termination by the counterparty in response, the party will think twice 
before going through the modification.  If, on the other hand, there is no loss of contractual 
surplus, there could be very little deterrence against self-serving modification. 
 
More generally, the relationship between directors and officers, on the one hand, 
and shareholders, on the other, is based on the notions of agency.  The relationship is more 
“vertical” and “hierarchical,” rather than “horizontal” or “arms-length” like the relationship 
between two contracting parties.91  Applying the notions of agency law, we often think of 
the shareholders as the de facto or de jure “principal” and the directors and the managers 
as the “agent” who can act on behalf of the corporation and the shareholders.92  And this 
vertical relationship imposes the fiduciary duty on directors and officers, which includes 
the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.  While directors and officers, as the agents, have 
the right to manage the business and the affairs of the corporation under Delaware law,93 
they must do so in the “best interest” of the corporation and its shareholders.  When we 
take into account that these agents are in charge of managing operations (and the 
shareholders are prohibited from interfering94) and that the shareholders are the “residual 
claimants” of the corporation, it follows that allowing the directors and the officers to 
unilaterally change the governance structures can give rise to the dangers of externality and 
hold-up.95 
 
IV. Policy Implications: Getting the Right Trade-off 
 
                                                 
91 The relationship does not necessarily fit nicely into the classic agency definition in the sense that the 
directors and the officers are acting “on behalf of” the corporation and its shareholders but subject to the 
shareholders’ “control.”  See Restatement (Third) of Agency §1.01 (defining agency as “fiduciary 
relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that 
the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests 
assent or otherwise consents so to act). 
92 Id.  Perhaps, this can justify why the breach of an agent’s obligation to the principal can justify stronger 
remedy, such as disgorgement and punitive damages, while breach of a contractual obligation ordinarily 
triggers expectation of damages and does not allow the victim to recover punitive damages.  See Restatement 
(Third) of Agency §8.01 (allowing various remedies, including injunction, forfeiture, and rescissory 
damages). 
93 See Delaware General Corporation Law §141(a). 
94 See Hamermesh (1998) on how bylaws interfering with the directors’ right to manage the corporation 
under DGCL §141(a) will be invalid.  See also CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 
(Del. 2008) (conflict between proxy expense reimbursement bylaw with DGCL §141(a) and attendant 
fiduciary duties of the directors). 
95 In economic theory, the principal-agent relationship represents a classic example of how one party’s 
(agent’s) actions directly affect another’s (principal’s) welfare. 
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What should be the policy objective with respect to charter and bylaw amendments, 
and, in particular, with respect to unilateral bylaw amendments?  To be clear, we do not 
argue that just because the courts have applied the “contractarian” framework to corporate 
charters and bylaws, we should literally treat them as contracts and subject them to contract 
law doctrines.  At the same time, just as the courts are “borrowing” the conception of 
contractual framework, we can also examine other principles in contract law to better 
formulate corporate law’s approach to charters and bylaws.  Nor do we argue that 
unilaterally amended bylaws are always detrimental to the shareholders.  Some directors 
and officers undoubtedly act in the best interest of the corporations and attempt to 
maximize the return for shareholders.  They presumably amend bylaws (or make charter 
amendment proposals) that would enhance such interest.  At the same time, no one will 
seriously argue that there are other directors and officers whose primary objective is to 
maximize their own private benefits and entrench themselves in the office.96  The first 
policy objective, therefore, should be screening: deter charter and bylaw amendments that 
are harmful to the corporation and detrimental to shareholders while allowing (promoting) 
amendments that are beneficial. 
 
Further, there is the issue of preserving flexibility.  Presumably, one of the reasons 
why a corporation would want to amend its charter and bylaws (even unilaterally by 
directors or shareholders), is to make sure that the corporation can effectively respond to 
new, previously unforeseen circumstances and challenges.  This is similar to the reason 
why contracting parties would want to modify the contract even though the performance 
has not been finished or would sometimes want to bestow the right to amend the contract 
to one of the parties.97  Particularly with respect to giving directors the right to unilaterally 
amend bylaws, because going through shareholder voting process is costly and time-
consuming, maintaining flexibility can be an important goal.  In reference to the 
aforementioned concerns over possible abuse and managerial opportunism, the policy goal, 
therefore, should be to devise a mechanism that will preserve the benefits of this flexibility  
while prohibiting value-destroying (and self-serving) amendments.  In this section, we 
discuss several different possibilities. 
 
A. Optional Redemption 
 
Assuming that giving each shareholder (or each share) an opt out right is not 
feasible, the first possibility is to give a redemption right to the shareholders, so that if they 
disagree with a proposed amendment, they can sell their shares back to the corporation at 
                                                 
96 The central rationale behind applying heightened judicial scrutiny in hostile takeover cases is based on the 
concerns about directors’ and officers’ entrenchment against the interest of shareholders.  See Unocal Corp. 
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
97 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, for instance, require that the modification must be done “in view of 
circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract is made.”  Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§89(a).  There is some uncertainty as to what “circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract 
is made” means and how strongly courts enforce that “requirement” to the extent that the courts adopt the 
Restatement’s approach.  The Uniform Commercial Code, in contrast, does not impose this requirement.  See 
UCC §2-209. 
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a redemption price.98  The redemption price can be set equal to the stock price prevailing 
before the announcement of the amendment so as to protect shareholders from suffering a 
loss.99  This would give the shareholders a bona fide termination right, right comparable to 
that of contracting parties.  Particularly with respect to bylaws that are unilaterally adopted 
by the directors or charter amendments that are opportunistically implemented by the 
directors and the officers, a de facto termination right can provide a stronger deterrence 
against the corporate agents.  Just like in a contract termination scenario, the corporation 
will now suffer an actual loss when the value-reducing bylaws or charters are adopted, and 
the shares are redeemed in response, compared to the case where the shareholders merely 
sold their shares to others. 
 
The problem with this proposal, however, is that the redemption right would 
potentially make corporate organization less stable and make the corporate form less 
attractive.  For instance, if the redemption price is set equal to the stock price prevailing 
before the amendment or before the announcement of the proposal, but the stock price 
subsequently goes down for unrelated reasons, the drop could lead to a potentially massive 
capital withdrawal and subsequent liquidity crisis.  Given that one of the primary benefits 
of choosing a corporate form is the capital lock-in and organizational stability, granting 
shareholders a strong redemption right could substantially eliminate that benefit.  There 
also is an issue with the deterrence benefit.  When redemption does occur, since the loss is 
born directly by the corporation—and indirectly by the remaining, non-redeeming 
shareholders, and not personally by directors, the size of the deterrence benefit may also 
be questionable.100 
 
B. Mandatory Pre-Amendment Disclosure 
 
Another possible solution is to strengthen the disclosure of proposed amendment 
before, rather than after, the amendment becomes effective.  With respect to charter or 
bylaw amendments that require shareholder approval, such a regime is already in place.101  
So, the proposal is more relevant for bylaw amendments that are done unilaterally by 
                                                 
98 Stock issued by a Delaware corporation can be made redeemable at the option of the holder.  See Delaware 
General Corporation Law §151(b) (“any stock…may be made subject to redemption by the corporation at its 
option or at the option of the holders of such stock or upon the happening of a specified event…).  In fact, in 
venture capital financing, redemption rights are often granted to preferred shareholders but the rights get 
triggered only when certain events, such as another round of financing or merger, take place.  See National 
Venture Capital Association Charter. 
99 Another possibility is to grant shareholders an appraisal remedy, under which dissenting shareholders can 
demand payment of the “fair value” of their shares.  Under the Model Business Corporation Act, with respect 
to certain charter amendments, shareholders have such a right.  See MBCA §13.02(a).  However, if the shares 
are publicly traded, shareholders are no longer entitled to the remedy.  See MBCA §13.02(b).  This is 
commonly known as the “market out” exception. 
100 To the extent that officers’ and (possibly) the directors’ compensation is tied to stock performance or the 
market valuation of the company, these corporate agents will also suffer, albeit partially, from any decrease 
in the stock price. 
101 For instance, under federal securities laws, charter amendment proposals are contained in the proxy for 
the shareholders’ meeting.  See Min (2018).  Even without federal securities regulations, under corporate 
law, any amendment proposal requiring shareholder approval will have to be circulated to shareholders in 
advance. 
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directors.  The idea is similar to the pre-modification disclosure in contracts, as required 
under the good faith and fair dealing obligations.102  In the context of corporations, 
however, pre-amendment disclosure will often be ineffective, particularly when there is an 
active trading market for the corporation’s stock.  With respect to unilaterally amended 
bylaws, given that the “proposed” bylaw amendment does not require shareholder approval 
and will become effective with certainty in the near future, the stock price will incorporate 
that information when the proposal is announced.  And, even if an existing stockholder 
were to try to terminate her relationship with the corporation by selling her stock, it is 
already too late, since, by then, the stock value has already decreased.103  Unless 
shareholders can stop the proposed amendment from becoming effective (e.g., by securing 
an injunction from a willing court, which will require stronger judicial oversight), the share 
price has already absorbed the future effects of the amendment, and the shareholders will 
suffer a loss. 
 
C. Shareholder Voting and Approval 
 
Another possibility is to rely more on the shareholder approval process.  Similar to 
mandatory pre-amendment disclosure, this is not relevant for charter or bylaw amendments 
that already require shareholder approval and is applicable to unilateral bylaw 
amendments.  Shareholder approval can take a few different forms.  First is to require the 
directors to get shareholders’ express approval (i.e., through voting or written consent) on 
any proposed bylaw amendment.  If the shareholders are displeased with the proposed 
amendment, they can simply vote down the proposal.  There are, at least, two problems 
associated with this.  Foremost, ex post shareholder vote on any proposal renders granting 
of the right to (unilaterally) amend bylaws to the directors somewhat useless.  Instead, it 
turns the bylaw amendment into something more like a charter amendment.104  Given that 
there is a distinction between charters and bylaws, and one of the goals of granting directors 
the right to unilaterally amend bylaws is to preserve flexibility, this proposal would 
undermine that objective.105  Furthermore, the proposal imposes a potentially substantial 
cost and delay.  When the directors want to amend the bylaws, they will have to wait until 
the next shareholders’ meeting or convene a special shareholders’ meeting to make the 
amendment effective.  For public corporations, given the cost of having to circulate a proxy 
under the federal securities laws, this imposes an additional cost on the bylaw amendment 
process. 
 
A second variation is to strengthen the shareholders’ right to undo or amend 
director-adopted bylaws.  Under both the Model Business Corporation Act and Delaware 
                                                 
102 See supra section III.D. 
103 Even if the stock is not listed on a national exchange or actively traded, presumably, if an existing 
shareholder wants to sell her stock to a third party, the amount the third party would be willing to pay for 
would be lower due to the value-destroying amendment. 
104 To amend the charter, directors must first make an amendment proposal and the proposal must be 
approved by the shareholders.  See Delaware General Corporation Law §242. 
105 As a possible compromise, we could require only the “material” bylaw amendments be submitted to the 
stockholders for approval.  Unless the question of “materiality” is answered through the statute, this can inject 
a substantial amount of uncertainty. 
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General Corporation Law, regardless of whether shareholders granted directors the power 
to amend bylaws, shareholders’ right to amend bylaws cannot be restricted.106  While this 
is possible, similar concerns arise as in shareholder voting.  To modify or repeal the bylaw 
provision adopted by directors, the shareholders will have to circulate a bylaw amendment 
proposal, convene a meeting (most likely at an annual shareholder meeting for a large 
publicly traded corporation, unless a block holder with sufficient ownership can call a 
special meeting), and secure a requisite affirmative vote to pass the proposal.  This may be 
quite costly and time-consuming.  Furthermore, when the directors’ right to amend bylaws 
is in place, one has to wonder whether the directors will promptly undo shareholders’ bylaw 
amendment.  So far, there is no case law that directly deals with this issue.107 
 
A third option is to leave the system as is, and allow shareholders to hold directors 
accountable through the director election process.  Indeed, this is the solution suggested by 
the Boilermakers court,108 when the court upheld a forum selection bylaw unilaterally 
adopted by the directors.  Similar to the problem of requiring bylaw amendment proposal 
be subject to a shareholder vote, this mechanism will also be costly and time-consuming.  
In fact, compared to the shareholder voting mechanism, this would be even more costly 
because the shareholders would likely have to engage in a contested election process.109  
Simply voting against directors at director elections would be insufficient.  Because the 
board of directors usually reserves the right to fill any vacancies, when a director fails to 
receive sufficient vote to be re-elected,110 the rest of the directors can appoint either the 
director-nominee who failed to receive the requisite affirmative votes or someone else who 
would be friendly to their cause.  To prevent this problem, the shareholders will have to 
come up with a competing slate of nominees.  Even if there is a block holder (e.g., a hedge 
fund or an active institutional shareholder), who may be willing to do this, this would 
require the block holder to wage a potentially costly proxy fight.  If there is no such block 
holder, it is extremely unlikely that any shareholder would be willing to spend the resources 
to wage a proxy fight.  Overall, using director elections to provide a necessary check on 
bylaw amendments may be a costly overkill. 
 
Finally, relying on shareholder voting mechanism is particularly ineffective if a 
bylaw has been adopted by a controlling shareholder or a bloc-holder.  When a controlling 
                                                 
106 See Model Business Corporation Act §10.20(a) and Delaware General Corporation Law §109(a).  This, 
of course, is subject to various legal and practical restrictions.  See Fisch (2018) on how the existing legal 
structure imposes limitations on shareholders’ power to amend bylaws, making shareholders’ right 
considerably weaker than that of the directors.  What this proposal is advocating for is to broaden or 
strengthen the rights of shareholders to amend or repeal board-adopted bylaws.  See also Smith, Wright & 
Hintz (2011) (advocating for giving more rights to the shareholders to adopt and amend bylaws). 
107 See supra note – on this cycling and counter-amendment issue.  Another problem of relying on 
shareholders’ repeal is that until repeal has been approved by shareholders, the undesired bylaw remains 
effective.  In contrast, if shareholders were to challenge the validity of a bylaw in court, the court can promptly 
strike it down. 
108 See supra Part I. 
109 See Hamermesh (2014) for various mechanisms that are (or can be) deployed by the resistant directors in 
minimizing shareholders’ nomination rights, particularly through the use of advance notice bylaws. 
110 See Delaware General Corporation Law §223(a)(1).  Citation needed on charters and bylaws that grant 
the right to fill vacancies to the directors. 
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shareholder, with more than 50% of the voting power, adopts a bylaw through shareholder 
vote, unless the minority shareholders can challenge the bylaw in court, there is no 
meaningful way for them to repeal or amend it.  Even when there is no controlling 
shareholder with de facto and de jure control, when a bylaw amendment is initiated and 
supported by a large bloc-holder, including, for instance, an activist shareholder, public 
shareholders may face an uphill battle to repeal or amend the bylaw.  Especially due to the 
recent rise of concentrated ownership, many with dual class stock structure, the  concerns 
over controlling shareholders’ possible abuse of power have become more salient.111 
 
D. Stronger Judicial Oversight 
 
The final option we consider is to subject charter and bylaw amendments to stronger 
judicial oversight.  The paper argues that given the relatively weak procedural protections 
given to dispersed shareholders, such as the weak termination and notification rights, a 
fairly persuasive case can be made for stronger judicial oversight.  Particularly in 
preserving flexibility while deterring managerial opportunism, stronger judicial oversight 
can play an effective role.  This part first discusses the existing corporate law doctrine of 
proper and equitable (reasonable) purpose test and then analyzes the idea of applying the 
good faith and fair dealing test, borrowed from contract law.  Lastly, the part discusses the 
advantages of imposing stronger judicial oversight. 
 
1. Proper and Equitable Purpose Test 
 
Under existing corporate law, courts have broad power to declare certain charter or 
bylaw provisions invalid or decline to enforce them on a case-by-case basis.  Especially 
for bylaws, existing case law requires the amendments be done for “proper” or “equitable” 
purpose.112  If the director-initiated bylaw amendment is deemed improper, inequitable, or 
unreasonable, shareholders can challenge the bylaw in court, and the court can either strike 
down the entire bylaw provision or deny it on a case-by-case basis.  While the proper or 
equitable purpose test has been in Delaware’s arsenal for quite some time from the seminal 
cases of Schnell and Frantz Manufacturing, as noted earlier, Delaware courts recently have 
seemed to shy away from a robust application of the test, as evidenced by cases such as 
ATP Tour and Boilermakers.113  Stronger judicial oversight implies that the courts revive 
the proper and equitable purpose test to more closely examine the purpose and effect (and 
the reasonableness) of charter and bylaw amendments, especially those unilaterally 
adopted. 
 
2. Borrowing from Contract Law Principles 
 
                                                 
111 See Albert Choi, Concentrated Ownership and Long-Term Shareholder Value, forthcoming in Harvard 
Business Law Review (2018) for a discussion over the recent rise of concentrated ownership in the U.S., 
especially using dual class stock. 
112 See Choi (2018) and Folk on the Delaware General Corporation Law §109.06.  See also Schnell and 
Frantz Mfg. 
113 See supra part II. 
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We can also find some ideas from contract law.  One approach is to utilize contract 
law’s various interpretation principles.  As seen earlier, when construing a change-of-terms 
clause, courts will attempt to infer the parties’ ex ante intent to determine how wide or 
narrow the discretion is by examining various extrinsic evidence surrounding the time of 
contract formation (or when the change-of-terms clause was entered into).  Also, if 
necessary, the court adopts a narrower interpretive posture so as to minimize the potential 
abuse of discretion and prevent hold-up.  Similar interpretation techniques can be applied 
to charters and bylaws.  For instance, if a certain provision has been recommended by the 
directors and approved by the shareholders, statements in the proxy or other extrinsic 
evidence (including how such terms were commercially perceived at the time) can be used 
to infer the parties’ intent.114  Such a technique can be useful in delineating the discretionary 
scope of the charter provision granting directors the right to unilaterally amend bylaws.  
Also, when an amended provision is ambiguous, contract law interpretation techniques can 
be applied to minimize ambiguity.  Especially in cases of ambiguity, the interpretation 
principle of contra proferentem can be deployed to interpret the terms against the drafter 
and to protect the counterparty.115 
 
The court can also employ the good faith and fair dealing obligations to charter and 
bylaw amendments.116  If the court determines that the amendment is either substantively 
or procedurally “unfair” to shareholders (or, for that matter, to the directors or officers) or 
that it is done in “bad faith,” the court can declare the amendment invalid or 
unenforceable.117  As noted earlier, under contract law, good faith and fair dealing 
obligations are widely understood to include, on procedural dimension, (1) pre-amendment 
notification; (2) right to terminate or opt out; and (3) non-retroactive application of the 
modified terms.  Foremost, a persuasive argument can be made that the unilaterally adopted 
bylaw provision should not be applied retroactively.118  In addition, given that, especially 
for corporations with publicly-traded stock, the disclosure right is ineffective and the 
termination right is absent, a case can be made for more proactive judicial review over the 
substantive terms to test whether they are “substantively unfair.”  This would be akin to 
                                                 
114 See Centaur Partners, IV v. National Intergroup, Inc., 582 A2d 923 (Del. 1990) (using statements from 
the proxy to determine the meaning of the phrase “any similar provision contained in the By-Laws of the 
corporation”). 
115 See, e.g., Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., C.A. No. 10636-VCL (Del. Ch. 2016) (stating that 
contra proferentem should apply to interpret the word “officer” contained in bylaws against the drafter-
corporation). 
116 The good faith and fair dealing obligations under contract law are different from the good faith obligation 
imposed under corporate law.  With respect to the latter, under current case law, the obligation is part of the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty.  See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).  Contract law-based good faith and 
fair dealing obligations can be imported not as part of the directors’ fiduciary duty but because the courts 
treat charters and bylaws as “contracts” between shareholders and the corporation.  See also supra note 21.  
Also, while the “fair dealing” component seems to invoke the entire fairness test under corporate law, the 
application of the contract law-based good faith and fair dealing test should not be tantamount to applying 
the entire (intrinsic) fairness test under corporate law.  As a starter, the burden of proof will remain on the 
plaintiff (rather than on the defendant under the entire fairness test) to show that the directors acted in “bad 
faith” or did not deal “fairly” when amending bylaws. 
117 The test can be applied to the entire clause as a whole (to determine, for instance, its facial validity) or on 
the application of the clause on a case-by-case basis. 
118 See supra note 81 (on “Halliburton” savings clause) and surrounding text. 
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strengthening the substantive prong in response to weak procedural protection, an approach 
that courts have often utilized in contract cases.119 
 
3. Benefits of Stronger Judicial Oversight 
 
Compared to the mechanisms that rely on shareholder voting, the solution of 
stronger judicial oversight can be deployed without substantial cost or delay.  When a 
shareholder (or a group of shareholders) wants to challenge a charter or a bylaw 
amendment, she will seek equitable relief to limit its application or undo the amendment.  
If the court is willing to entertain this argument, the court can decide on the issue of (facial) 
validity fairly quickly.  This provides the advantage of speed and low cost.  Also, since the 
case is likely to be brought in a derivative manner or as a direct class action with an attorney 
who is incentivized to receive compensation, the mechanism can minimize the problems 
of collective action.120  Finally, Delaware courts would be quite capable of allowing value-
enhancing amendments while preventing self-serving amendments, thus promoting 
flexibility through case-by-case resolution. 
 
The principles of “equitable” or “proper” purpose and “good faith” and “fair 
dealing” will apply equally to unilateral bylaw amendments by shareholders—not just 
directors.  For public corporations with dispersed or passive institutional ownership, 
shareholders abusing their unilateral amendment power is quite unlikely.  On the other 
hand, potential shareholder abuse (or opportunism) could be important when a corporation 
has a controlling shareholder, with over 50% of the voting power, or a shareholder with 
substantial bloc-ownership, e.g., an activist institutional owner.121  In either case, a 
controlling shareholder or a bloc-holder can successfully amend the bylaws to either 
impede the directors’ and officers’ right to manage the business and affairs of the 
corporation or to undermine the rights of the minority (or passive) shareholders.122  If we 
                                                 
119 See unconscionability cases mentioned in part II. 
120 In most derivative actions, plaintiff’s attorneys will be entitled to receive compensation from the 
corporation so long as the outcome of the litigation, either through judgment or settlement, creates a 
“common fund” or produces a “substantial benefit” to the corporation (and the shareholders).  Since 
nullifying a bylaw will not ordinarily create a common monetary fund, the court will have to declare that it 
produces a substantial benefit to the corporation (or to the shareholders).  This substantial benefit test, 
properly applied, can also function as a screening mechanism against frivolous lawsuits.  See Sean Griffith, 
Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 
Boston College Law Review 1 (2015) for more detailed analysis on substantial benefit and common fund 
doctrines.  There are obviously dangers and costs to relying on or inducing more shareholder litigation.  But 
when the courts become more vigilant with respect to whether a “substantial benefit” exists for the 
corporation and the shareholders, such costs can be more effectively controlled.  Recent instances of 
shareholder litigation in mergers and acquisitions transaction is exemplary.  See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder 
Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016).  See also Albert Choi, Optimal Fee-Shifting Bylaws, forthcoming in 
Virginia Law Review (2018) on how the Delaware legislature and the courts could allow symmetric fee-
shifting system to encourage meritorious lawsuits while discouraging non-meritorious ones. 
121 See Albert Choi, Concentrated Ownership and Long-Term Shareholder Value, forthcoming in Harvard 
Business Law Review (2018). 
122 See Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442 (2011) (invalidating a reserve stock split bylaw 
amendment executed by the directors because it favored the controlling shareholder at the expense of 
minority shareholders); and Hollinger International, Inc. v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022 (Del. Ch. 2004) 
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were to keep the existing framework and preserve the fidelity to the “contractarian” 
principle with little judicial oversight, there may be very little that directors or minority 
shareholders can do police controlling shareholders’ or bloc-holders’ abuse.123  Through 
stronger judicial oversight, we can restore the symmetry in deterring abuse by directors 
and officers, on the one hand, and the shareholders, on the other. 
 
Stronger judicial oversight can also apply to cases where a proposed bylaw or 
charter amendment has been approved by the shareholders.  Under contract law, even for 
a bilateral modification (a modification that has been agreed to by both parties), the court 
can still declare the modified provision unenforceable.  The purpose, under contract law, 
is to prevent hold-up and abuse of bargaining power.124  In the context of charter or bylaw 
amendments putatively approved by shareholders, particularly when ownership is 
dispersed, the collective action and rational apathy problems can prevent shareholders from 
giving meaningful consent to the proposal.125  The problem may be more acute with respect 
to charter amendments, where the directors have the sole power to make an amendment 
proposal,126 and to cases where there is a controlling shareholder or a bloc-holder.  When 
the directors or the controlling shareholder (or the bloc-holder) are vested with the de facto 
power to set the agenda, knowing that the dispersed shareholders suffer from the collective 
action and rational apathy problems, they can implement charter or bylaw provisions that 
                                                 
(invalidating bylaws enacted by a controlling shareholder that prevented the board “from acting on any matter 
of significance except by unanimous vote” and “set the board’s quorum requirement at 80%” because the 
bylaws “were clearly adopted for an inequitable purpose and have an inequitable effect.”).  But see Frantz 
Manufacturing Co. v. EAC Industries, 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985) (validating bylaws adopted by a majority 
stockholder that increased the board quorum requirement and mandated that all board actions be unanimous.  
The court found that the amendments were “a permissible part of [the stockholder’s] attempt to avoid its 
disenfranchisement as a majority stockholder” and, thus, were “not inequitable under the circumstances.”). 
123 Especially due to the recent rise of dual class stock with concentrated ownership, this issue has become 
much more salient.  Somewhat interestingly, courts have been more willing to apply the “equitable” or 
“proper” purpose test to controlling shareholders’ unilateral bylaw amendments.  See Choi (2018) (on the 
rise of dual class stock and concentrated ownership).  These two lines of cases, one dealing with directors 
and the other dealing with controlling shareholders, have created a curious asymmetry in case law.  One of 
the arguments of the paper is to harmonize these two lines of cases and also to import (or revive) the “good 
faith” and “fair dealing” principles. 
124 See, e.g., Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewing Co., 103 Mo. 578 (1891) and Alaska Packers’ Assn. v. 
Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).  Before the adoption of “fair and equitable” test by the Restatement 
and the “good faith” test by the Uniform Commercial Code, courts used to apply the pre-existing duty rule 
to safeguard against hold-up and abuse of bargaining power, under which a modification for additional 
compensation for an existing promise would be held unenforceable.  See generally Farnsworth (2004) §§4.21 
and 4.22. 
125 See Bebchuk (1989) (arguing that because the benefits accrue to all shareholders, individual shareholder 
will under-spend in investigating the likely effects of a charter amendment and this will lead to inaccurate 
pricing of an amendment proposal) and Min (2018) (how even institutional shareholders do not necessarily 
get informed and are incentivized to adopt the recommendations from proxy advisory firms). 
126 See Min (2018) for examples of “opportunistic” or “preemptive” charter amendment proposals made by 
the directors and approved by the dispersed shareholders. 
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are much more favorable to them and at the expense of the (minority) shareholders.127  
Through more active judicial monitoring, such abuses can be deterred. 
 
Stronger judicial oversight will not operate in vacuum: it will operate together with 
the other policy tools, including director elections and shareholders amending or repealing 
board-adopted bylaws.128  To the extent that the shareholders do not have a meaningful 
termination right, nor an effective pre-amendment notification right and also that approval 
mechanisms are costly to execute and subject to collective action and rational apathy 
problems, judicial oversight can become an effective check against directorial (or 
controlling shareholder’s) abuse of power.  It will function as a complementary mechanism 
to the others.  Particularly when the directors have the delegated power to amend bylaws, 
while preserving the benefits of flexibility through delegation, it can mitigate the problems 
of externality and hold-up.  Finally, because the judicial oversight mechanism taps into the 
existing corporate and contract law doctrines, it requires minimal change to the existing 
legal structure.  The “proper” or “equitable” purpose test has been part of corporate law for 
a long time, and one could argue, this is also true of the “good faith” and “fair dealing” 
obligations.129  By restoring and applying these common law-based doctrines, not only will 
the “contractarian” principle be applied in its truest form, but the corporate law doctrine 
can be harmonized with agency law principles.130 
 
Conclusion 
 
Over the past decade, courts have more willingly applied the theory that the 
corporate charters and bylaws constitute a “contract” between the shareholders and the 
corporations and have upheld a number of bylaw provisions that were unilaterally adopted 
by directors.  The focus of this paper is to examine this “contractarian” principle by, 
foremost, looking at the comparable issues under contract law.  In particular, the paper 
highlights the fact that the right to unilaterally amend bylaws under corporate law is similar 
to the change-of-terms clauses under contract law; and, under contract law, the exercise of 
such discretion is subject to various (statutory and common law) restrictions, including the 
obligation to act in good faith and deal fairly with the counterparty.  Notwithstanding the 
similarity, when we compare the rights of contracting parties with those of shareholders, 
the rights of the shareholders are insufficient on one key dimension: the right to terminate 
the shareholder-corporation relationship.  The lack of meaningful termination (or opt out) 
                                                 
127 See In re Delphi Financial Group Shareholder Litigation, 2012 WL 729232 (Del. Ch. 2012) (controlling 
shareholder attempting to receive a control premium in a merger through a charter amendment by requiring 
the shareholders to simultaneously vote on the merger and the charter amendment). 
128 Coffee (1989) has argued that, whether we regard corporation as a nexus of contract, real entities, or 
artificial entities, the one immutable constant is “the institution of judicial oversight.”  See Coffee (1989) at 
1621.  One of us has argued how utilizing an open-ended standard can better allow contracting parties to 
police opportunism.  See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly 
Verification, 37 Journal of Legal Studies 503 (2008). 
129 See In re Delphi Financial Group Shareholder Litigation, 2012 WL 729232 (Del. Ch. 2012) (noting that 
a charter amendment is subject to the good faith and fair dealing obligations). 
130 Under agency law, contract law principles will apply to interpret an agency agreement.  See Restatement 
(Third) of Agency §8.07 cmt. b (stating that “contract law principles of general applicability govern whether 
such agreements are enforceable and how they are to be interpreted, among other questions.”). 
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right, combined with the fact that the relationship between shareholders and directors (and 
minority shareholders and the controlling shareholder) is more hierarchical rather than 
horizontal, implies that the shareholders (or the minority shareholders) may be more 
vulnerable to managerial or controlling shareholders’ opportunism. 
 
In considering different mechanisms, the paper has argued that the policy goal 
should be to mitigate the problems of hold-up and opportunism while preserving the 
flexibility in amending corporation’s organizational documents.  With that in mind, the 
paper has examined various mechanisms, including optional redemption, more robust 
disclosure rights, shareholder voting, and judicial oversight.  After considering the 
possibilities, the paper suggests that stronger judicial oversight may be better able to 
achieve the policy goal.  By more vigorously applying the “proper” and “equitable” 
purpose test, or by imposing the good faith and fair dealing obligations borrowed from 
contract law, the paper has argued that the court can better deter both directors’ and 
controlling shareholder’s opportunism and guard against the problems of collective action 
and rational apathy.  At the same time, unlike other costly, time-consuming, or possibly 
ineffective mechanisms, because courts with expertise can deter opportunistic amendments 
more quickly and at lower cost, the flexibility desired for shareholders and managers in 
ordering their private affairs can be better preserved. 
 
 
 
